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Throughout its modern history, Japan has conceived of itself as 
ethnically one. Various explanations account for this politics of 
ethnic homogeneity: geographical isolation from the rest of Asia; 
self-imposed closure to the rest of the world; and a cultural 
disposition that is introverted, communitarian-minded, or simply 
xenophobic. 1 Each theory may reflect aspects of a broader tmth, 
t Lecturer-in-Law and Senior Research Scholar, Yale Law School; Senior Fellow, China 
Law Center. I am grateful to my audiences at the University of North Carolina School of 
Law, and the University of Washington School of Law for their perceptive feedback. I 
thank Morgan Davis, Stacey Allred, and the rest of the editmial staff at the North 
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation for their editorial 
suggestions and gracious hospitality. 
I See generally TESSA MORRIS-SUZUKI, BORDERLINE JAPAN 10-11 (2010) 
(discussing various theories to explain Japan's "closed country" mindset); Tessa Morris-
Suzuki, Immigration and Citizenship in ContemporaiJ' Japan, in JAPAN - CHANGE & 
CONTINUITY, 163, 171-72 (Javed Maswood, Jeffrey Graham & Hideaki Miyajima eds., 
2002) (discussing Japan's modem "cosmetic multiculturalism" that recognizes limited 
diversity and the constraints of xenophobia); John Lie, The Discourse of Japaneseness, 
in JAPAN & GLOBAL MIGRATION: FOREIGN WoRKERS AND THE ADVENT OF A 
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but they collectively overlook the institutional features of Japan's 
ethnic homogeneity. This paper suggests that a matrix of laws and 
policies from the late nineteenth cenhny to the present 
simultaneously privileges ethnic Japanese and subordinates other 
ethnic groups. Numerous laws and regulations decide who 
belongs in Japan, who qualifies for citizenship, and who deserves 
legal protection under Japanese law.2 Focusing on the institutional 
factors of the "ethno-state," this article examines practices and 
decisions of the contemporary Japanese state and its policies to 
deal with other ethnicities. 
After discussing the historical manifestations of the ethno-
state, this article posits a meaningful role for intemational human 
rights law ("IHRL") in entrenching the rights of ethnic minorities 
in Japan. Though IHRL cannot possibly solve all of Japan's racial 
and ethnic problems, it has alleviated many of them, and it has the 
potential to do so for others. 3 Since the early 1980s, when it 
signed many intemational instruments, Japan has increasingly 
confom1ed to the basic principles of IHRL, both revising 
discriminatory laws and instituting new, more protective ones. 4 
Yet even when Japan does not change its laws and policies, IHRL 
can provide plaintiffs a legal basis, additional moral suasion, and a 
broader panoply of standards by which to evaluate state policy, 
MULTrCULTURAL SOCIETY 70, 84 (Mike Douglass & Glenda S. Roberts eds., 2000) ("The 
central conclusion and the fundamental assumption of all Nihonjinron writings are that 
Japanese people and culture are different, even unique."). 
2 See inji-a Pati I (analyzing the Japanese Constitution, election laws, refugee 
policies, Immigration Acts, and other laws and policies dealing with foreigners and their 
legal status in Japan). 
3 See inFa Part II (discussing three types of cases in which minorities have 
successfully used and Japanese judges have cited to international human rights law to 
challenge domestic discriminatory policies). 
4 By 1980, Japan had signed only two of the major international human rights 
conventions, but by 1999, Japan had ratified many of the important human rights 
instruments, such as the Convention Against Torture, the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 
See Univ. of Minn., Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties -Japan, UNIV. 
OF MINN. HUMAN RIGHTS LIBRARY, 
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ratification-japan.html (last visited Mar. 26, 
2011 ). See also Timothy Webster, Reconstructing Japanese Lmv: International Norms 
and Domestic Legislation, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 211 (2008), for a discussion of the 
attempts and prospects of incorporating international human rights law into national and 
local1aws banning racial discrimination. 
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administrative action, and other instrumentalities of the state. 
IHRL is no panacea to all of Japan's ills, but its ratification has led 
to notable victmies for minority plaintiffs, a forum to challenge 
state laws and policies, and occasional condemnation or legislative 
guidance. 5 International law has helped Japan recognize ethnic 
others, improve its treatment of them, and endow them with 
ce1iain unalienable rights. 6 
This paper proceeds in two pmis. Pmi I explains how Japan 
has actively promoted an ethnically homogenous state, beginning 
with a brief detour of critical race theory as developed in the 
United States. From the Meiji pe1iod onward, the Japanese 
government has implemented a wide range of laws and policies to 
assimilate indigenous people, exclude foreign nationals, 
denationalize ethnic minorities, weaken legal protections to non-
ethnic Japanese, and privilege the Japanese diaspora in 
i1mnigration policy. 7 The combined effect of such practices has 
been an extraordinarily high degree of ethnic homogeneity across 
decades, a rise in the status of ethnic Japanese in the count1y's 
racial hierarchy, and the hardening of that hierarchy. 8 Part II 
investigates the ways that IHRL has challenged aspects of the 
ethno-state through two important mechanisms: amending laws 
that offend international law and offering a legal basis for etlmic 
minority plaintiffs to ground their claims. 
I. Japan's Promotion of Ethnic Homogeneity 
Before turning to Japan, it is important to realize that the 
United States also has a long history of using law to privilege one 
5 See infra Part II (analyzing cases in which plaintiffs in Japanese discriminatory 
cases have successfully relied on IHRL and judges have used IHRL to support their 
holdings). 
6 Following Ian Haney Lopez, I deploy a relatively diffuse concept of law, 
incorporating not simply legislation passed by the Japanese Diet (legislature), but also 
policies promulgated by various ministries in the Cabinet (executive) and judicial 
decisions. While this may blur issues such as accountability-for some government 
actors are likely more responsible than others-this broad view offers insight into the 
panorama of state policies used both to privilege one racial or ethnic group and to 
subordinate another. IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BYLAW 80 (2d ed. 2006). 
7 See infra Part I. 
8 See infra Part I. 
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ethnic group over others.9 Critical race theorists have described 
the United States as a "racial state" that has limited the privileges 
of citizenship and equal protection of the law to white people. 10 
Michael Omi and Howard Winant find the State is "inherently 
racial," 11 and the main objectives of its racial policy are 
"repression and exclusion."12 For example, the Naturalization Act 
of 1790, which restricted U.S. citizenship to "free white persons," 
is reflective of the state's racist inclinations during its foundational 
period. 13 Even before this Act, the U.S. Constitution itself 
contained the "three-fifths compromise," 14 which excluded 
"Indians" in full and reduced by forty percent the number of slaves 
to be counted in a state's population to determine congressional 
representation. 15 In other words, the Constitution did not view 
Native Ameticans and slaves-most of whom were African-
American-as fully human. 16 They were not considered full 
persons for the purpose of assigning representation in the federal 
government and were forbidden from the political processes. 17 
Racially preferential laws did not end with the early colonial 
period. Ian Haney Lopez has excavated laws and court decisions 
from the eighteenth to the twentieth century that subordinated 
Native Americans, Asians, Asian Americans, and African-
Americans to white people in various ways. 18 For instance, 
[t]he naturalization laws governed who was and was not 
welcome to join the polity, antimiscegenation laws 
regulated sexual relations, and segregation laws told people 
where they could and could not live and work. Together, 
9 See MICHAEL 0MI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED 
STATESFROMTHE 1960STOTHE 1990s 81-82 (2ded. 1994). 
10 !d. at 81-82. 
11 Id. at 82. 
12 Id. at 81. 
13 Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, l Stat. 103, repealed by Naturalization Act of 
1795, ch. 20,1 Stat. 414. 
14 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV. 
15 James Madison actually proposed the ratio of three-fifths after proposed 
compromises of one-half and three-quarters were deemed unsatisfactory. GARRY WILLS, 
"NEGRO PRESIDENT" JEFFERSON AND THE SLAVE POWER 52-54 (2003). 
16 See id. 
17 Seeid. 
18 LOPEZ, supra note 6, at 78-85. 
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such laws ... established material conditions of belonging 
and exclusion that code as race. In all of these ways, legal 
rules constructed race. 19 
561 
Haney Lopez highlights several laws and policies policing 
boundaries of the racial divide, but does not suggest that law is the 
only tool to sublimate whites. 20 
Given the long history of racialized laws and policies in the 
United States, it is not surprising to find similar policies in other 
countries. Japan is a far less ethnically diverse country; among the 
countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, only Korea and Iceland are more homogenous. 21 
Also, Japan has historically been less open to immigration than the 
United States. To remark on Japan's etlmic homogeneity is on one 
level, to state the obvious. But on another level, it is to comment 
on over a centmy of laws and policies that both promote the notion 
of a separate and singular Japanese ethnicity and privilege the 
position of ethnically Japanese people vis-a-vis ethnic others. 
Since the Meiji Period (1868-1912), Japan has enacted a wide 
range of policies to produce, and reproduce, an ethnically 
homogenous nation-state.22 By limiting the number of foreigners 
allowed into Japan, tightly policing citizenship requirements, 
expelling ethnic others, privileging the Japanese diaspora in 
immigration policy, assimilating indigenous persons and ethnic 
others, and maintaining a rigid refugee regime, the Japanese state 
has indelibly shaped the body politic and the body genetic.23 
A. Meiji Period 
Japan's policies of ethnic unity date from the late nineteenth 
centmy. 24 During the Meiji Period, Japan opened itself up to 
19 Jd. at 85. 
20 Jd. 
21 See James D. Fearon, Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Countl)', 8 J. ECON. 
GRO\VTH 195 (2003) (showing Japan and Korea are ranked lowest in their region for 
etlmic diversity). 
22 Japan's assimilation of the Ainu indigenous people began in the 1870s, while 
restrictions on foreign labor began in the late 1890s. See infra, notes 28-32 and 
accompanying text (describing restrictions on foreign labor), and notes 41-51 and 
accompanying text (describing policies on the Ainu). 
23 See infra, Parts I.B, I.C, I.D. 
24 See supra note 22. 
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various modes of Western learning: science, technology, military, 
medicine, culture, literature, colonialism, and other fields. 25 But it 
also implemented policies similar to those taken by Western 
powers in matters of immigration and indigenous peoples?6 Two 
groups that concerned the Japanese government were Chinese 
laborers and the Ainu-an indigenous population in northern 
Japan.27 
In 1899, a few years after defeating China and colonizing 
Taiwan, Japan issued two directives to restrict foreign 
immigration. 28 The first, an Imperial Ordinance, limited 
immigrant labor for the first time in Japan's history, pennitting 
foreign migrants to live in Japan, but only if they refrained from 
working in a range of low-skilled occupations. 29 A second 
directive specified positions forbidden to foreigners, such as 
"fanning, fishing, mmmg, constmction, building, [and] 
manufacture."30 Under that directive, foreigners could be tailors, 
cloth merchants, servants, knife-grinders, and so forth. 31 These 
policies protected Japanese workers from competition in skilled 
labor, aiming primarily at one common type of nineteenth-century 
immigrant: mainland Chinese who would work for lower wages. 32 
Faced with similar fears of inexpensive Chinese labor, the 
United States and Australia reacted with even more sweeping 
legislation. In the United States, the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Acf3 
prohibited not only the immigration of Chinese subjects, but also 
25 See JOHN LIE, MULT!ETHNTC JAPAN 36 (200!) ("Catching up with the West was 
perhaps the most important prewar national mandate . . . . [L ]eaders acknowledged 
Western superiority and sought to emulate the West."). 
26 See inji-a notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing legislation in the 
United States and Australia that restricted the immigration of the Chinese). 
27 See Mark A. Levin, Essential Commodities and Racial Justice: Using 
Constitutional Protection of Japan's Indigenous Ainu People to Iriform Understandings 
of the United States and Japan, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 419, 420-425 (2001) 
(discussing the Ainu and their history). 
28 See MORRIS-SUZUTU, supra note l, at 4!-42. 
29 !d. at 42-44 (discussing Imperial Ordinance No. 352 of 1899). 
30 !d. at 44 (quoting the Ministry of the Interior's Directive No. 42 of 1899). 
31 !d. 
32 See id. at 44-45; see also LIE, supra note 25, at !04. 
33 Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (!882) (barring Chinese 
laborers from entering the United States) (repealed 1943). 
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banned their naturalization. It was the only United States law ever 
to ban a pmiicular nationality. 34 The White Australia Policy 35 
likewise restricted Chinese and other Asian immigrants to the 
antipodes. 36 In the late nineteenth century, Japan strode alongside 
Western governments, which restricted immigration and imposed 
racially selective qualifications for citizenship. Like those 
countries, Japan resisted ethnic dilution by keeping out foreigners, 
assimilating indigenous others into more Japanese ways of living, 
and thereby privileging the position occupied by ethnic Japanese. 
A similar approach to immigration reemerged nearly a century 
later, in 1989, when Japan revised its Immigration Control Acf7 
to keep out other Asians while welcoming "back" ethnic Japanese 
from countries such as Brazil, Pem, and the United States.38 
Meiji ethnic policy was not solely concerned with foreign 
threats, but also targeted ethnic groups within Japan. 39 In the 
1870s and 1880s, the Japanese government passed a series of 
policies to assimilate, or more specifically, to Japanize the Ainu.40 
Ainu cultural practices, such as tattooing and cremating the dead 
in their homes, were prohibited. 41 Likewise, the government 
34 See LOPEZ, supra note 6, at 32. 
35 The policy refers to several measures passed by the colonies and federal 
government of Australia fi·om the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. For 
instance, several Australian colonies excluded Chinese miners during the gold rush of 
the 1950s. The Australian federal government's first laws included the Immigration 
RestJiction Act of 190 I (which allowed immigration officers to offer written tests in 
European languages) and the Naturalization Act of 1903 (which denied citizenship and 
the right to vote to non-Europeans). See generally Catherine Skulan, Australia's 
MandatOIJ' Detention of "Unauthorized" Asylum Seekers: HistOIJI, Politics and Analysis 
Under International Law, 26 GEO. lMMlG. L.J. 61,66-67 (2006). 
36 See MORRJS-SUZUKJ, supra note 1, at 163-64. 
37 Immigration Control Act, Cabinet Order No. 319 of 1951, amended by Law No. 
79 of 1989. 
38 See Bumsoo Kim, From Exclusion to Inclusion? The Legal Treatment of 
"Foreigners" in Contemporwy Japan, 24 IMMIGRANTS & MINORJTJES 51, 64 (2006); see 
also Timothy Webster, Reconstituting Japanese Law: International Norms and Domestic 
Legislation, 30 MTCH. J. INT'L L. 211, 214-16 (2008) (describing how the Act and 
subsequent regulations pe1mitted the children and grandchildren of Japanese nationals to 
obtain preferential visa treatment). 
39 See RJCHARD SIDDLE, RACE, RESISTANCE AND THE AINu OF JAPAN 114 (1996). 
40 See id. at 115-16 (1996). 
41 See Kayano v. Holdcaido Expropriation Committee, 1598 HANREI JIHO 
33 (Sapporo D. Ct., Mar. 27, 1997), translated in Mark A. Levin, 
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bmmed traditional modes of sustenance on· which the Ainu 
depended for their survival: fishing with traditional nets, felling 
timber, and removing bark from trees.42 
With the passage of the 1899 Hokkaido Former Aborigine 
Protection Act, 43 the Japanese government accelerated the 
assimilation of the Ainu. 44 The Act itself provided various fonns 
of assistance to the Ainu in agriculture (land grants, seeds, tools, 
and other supplies), education (buildings and schools), and social 
welfare. 45 But despite the beneficent intentions of the law, 
scholars have suggested that the emphasis on agriculture sought to 
push the Ainu towards more cognizably Japanese pursuit such as 
farming, and away from traditional Ainu modes of subsistence 
such as fishing and hunting.46 The provision of seeds and tools 
was "limited and haphazard," and the land grants were ineffective 
and often significantly smaller than provided by law.47 Indeed, the 
Protection Act was part of a broader web of policies promoting the 
"eradication of [Ainu] language, customs and values." 48 
Henceforth, the Ainu were to acculturate into Japan by assuming 
Japanese names, speaking the Japanese language, and engaging in 
farming, day labor, and other ostensibly Japanese jobs.49 A 193 7 
revision to the Act aimed primarily at providing welfare assistance 
to the Ainu because the "original objective of the Protection Act, 
the Japanization of the Ainu, was seen as having largely been 
accomplished." 50 To this day, only about 25,000 people self-
Kayano \'. Hokkaido Expropriation Commirtee, 38 I.L.M. 394 ([999). Early 
treatment of the Ainu appears toward the end of the opinion. !d. at 422. 
42 Jd. at 422-23. 
43 Holdmido kylidojin hogoho [Holdmido Fom1er Aborigine Protection Act], Law 
No. 27, Mar. l, 1899 (Japan), reprinted in SIDDLE, supra note 39, at app. 1, 194-96 
(English translation). The name of the legislation itself is quite suggestive. By calling 
the Ainu "former aborigines," the Act assetis that the State has successfully integrated 
the "aboriginal" Ainu into "modem" Japanese way of living. I d. 
44 See LIE, supra note 25, at 92. 
45 See SIDDLE, supra note 39, at 70. A translation of the law appears in the 
appendix. See id. at 194. 
46 See LIE, supra note 25, at 92. 
47 See SIDDLE, supra note 39, at 71. 
48 !d. at 70-71. 
49 Jd. 
so Id. at 144. 
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identify as Ainu, though perhaps as many as 300,000 Japanese 
could claim Ainu ancestry? This suggests that the policies have 
limited the number of people who identify as Ainu, while 
increasing the number identifying as Japanese. Numerically at 
least, the Japanese assimilation ofthe Ainu was a success. 
B. Multiethnic Empire (1910-1945) 
As Japan's colonial ambitions mounted, however, a more 
expansive assimilation policy emerged. Immigration to Japan, 
both voluntary and involuntary, grew over the course of its 
colonial period (1895-1945), pmiicularly towards the end. 52 With 
the annexation of Taiwan in 1895, Korea in 1910, Manchmia in 
1931, and Singapore in 1942, Japan led an essentially multiethnic 
empire.53 Japan, however, did not aim to integrate colonial others 
with ethnic Japanese. 54 Despite a range of assimilation policies 
with varying degrees of success, Japan essentially opposed 
assimilation between colonial others and Japanese.55 Japan sought 
to maintain positions of privilege for ethnic Japanese. 56 The 
"actual environment of Japanese colonialism was hostile to any 
true merger of the Japanese with their dependent peoples,"57 As 
manifest in both active discouragement of intem1arriage and 
relatively cloistered quarters in the metropole. 58 
Despite legal equality between Japanese and colonized 
subjects, there was little doubt that the Japanese retained the 
positions of power in colonial relations. While there may have 
been talk of universal brotherhood and equal treatment (isshi 
d6jin) between colonized peoples and Japanese and legal equality 
51 See LIE, supra note 25, at 4. 
52 See MOKRJS-SUZUKJ, supra note 1, at 42-44 (noting that surprisingly Japan did 
not have a centralized system of inunigration control until it took measures during the 
end of the nineteenth century when it first acquired a colony, namely Taiwan). 
53 See LOYD E. LEE, WORLD WAR 2 IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC AND THE WAR'S 
AFTERMATH, WITH GENERAL THEMES 122 ( 1998). 
54 See MORRJS-SUZUKJ, supra note 1, at 42-43. 
55 1d. 
56 Mark R. Peattie, Japanese Attitudes Toward Colonialism, 1895-1945, in THE 
JAPANESE COLONIAL EMPIRE 80,98 (Ramon H. Myers & Mark R. Peattie eds., 1984). 
57 1d. 
58 1d. 
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guaranteed as a matter of imperial citizenship (teikoku shinmin),59 
colonial subjects only enjoyed de jure equality. To ensure 
segregation of Japanese and colonial populations, the Japanese 
govemment maintained separate family registries (hoseA.i) for 
ethnic Japanese (naichijin-people of the interior) and for 
colonized subjects (gaichijin-people of the exterior).60 Distinct 
registries ensured that colonized subjects were still marked as 
"other" and filed away accordingly. 61 The family registry system 
contains information about one's lineage that employers, schools, 
potential spouses, and others may wish to access before making a 
decision about employment, matriculation, or marriage, often for 
discriminatory purposes.62 After World War II, separate registries 
facilitated the separation of ethnic Korean and Taiwanese from 
ethnic Japanese, leading to their eventual denationalization.63 
In the early 1940s, as the war effort decimated the Japanese 
labor force, Japan started to mobilize Koreans-usually forcibly-
from the peninsula to work in Japan. 64 The same was tme for 
mainland Chinese. 65 Both Koreans and Chinese performed hard 
labor in mines, factmies, and construction sites throughout the 
archipelago.66 By the time Japan smTendered in 1945, over two 
million Koreans resided in Japan,67 as did over 40,000 mainland 
59 See LIE, supra note 25, at 123. 
60 Yuji Iwasawa, Legal Treatment of Koreans in Japan: The Impact of 
International Human Rights Law on Japanese Lmv, 8 HuM. RTS. Q. 131, 144 (1986). 
61 See id at 146. 
62 See generally Taimie L. Bryant, For the Sake of the Count!)', For the Sake of the 
Fami~v: The Oppressive Impact of Family Registration on Women and A;Iinorities in 
Japan, 39 UCLA L. REV. 109 (1991) (discussing the impact of the family registration 
system in Japan). The family registry helps maintain hierarchy in Japanese society by 
excluding persons such as illegitimate children, burakwnin (ethnic Japanese who have 
historically worked in undesirable or culturally "unclean" professions) and resident 
Koreans and Taiwanese. Id Information on the family registry is used by employers, 
potential spouses and schools to learn more about a person, and evaluate his or her 
desirability accordingly. See id. at 111-12. 
63 See Kim, supra note 38, at 51, 56. 
64 See id at 55. 
65 Timothy Webster, Note, Sisyphus in a Coal Mine: Responses to Slave Labor in 
Japan and the United States, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 733, 736 (2006). 
66 Kim, supra note 38, at 55. 
67 !d. 
r 
! 
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Chinese. 68 The Chinese were sent back, but at least some of the 
Koreans chose to remain in Japan, as discussed in the following 
section. 
When it suited Japan's political aspirations, even Koreans and 
Taiwanese could be legal equals to ethnic Japanese nationals, at 
least as a matter oflaw. Despite formal equality, however, there is 
no doubt that resident Koreans and resident Taiwanese have 
enjoyed second-class treatment in Japan from the colonial period 
to the present. 
C. Postvvar Period (1945-1980) 
After World War II, the Allied powers attempted to 
democratize Japan. 69 The Potsdam Declaration proposed that, 
"[t]he Japanese Govemment shall remove all obstacles to the 
revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the 
Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, 
as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be 
established."70 The Declaration's focus on "the Japanese people" 
may have unwittingly overlooked the presence of over two million 
non-Japanese who resided in the archipelago after the war, most of 
them Korean. 71 In brief, the Occupation Years (1945-1952) were 
foundational not only in rebuilding and transfonning Japanese 
society, but also in promoting a distinctly ethnic Japanese 
citizenship that rested atop the pyramid of privileges. 
Japan's reorientation was complicated. The imperial power 
that once sought to colonize all of East Asia tumed inward to 
address problems stemming from its militaristic drift of the 1930s 
and 1940s. After the war, and under intense pressure from the 
American "allies," a primary item of democratization was a new 
Constitution. 72 Spearheaded by the Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Powers ("SCAP"), and General Douglas MacArthur, many 
68 Webster, supra note 65, at 736. 
69 See Timothy Webster, Note, Legal Excisions "Omissions Are Not Accidents, 39 
CORNELL lNT'L L.J. 435,440-41 (2006). 
70 Potsdam Declaration: U.S.-China-Gr. Brit. ~IO, Jul. 26, 1945, available at 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html. 
71 See Sonia Ryang, Resident Koreans in Japan, in KOREANS IN JAPAN: CRITICAL 
VOICES FROM THE MARGIN l, 3-4 (Sonia Ryang ed. 2000). 
72 See Webster, supra note 69, at 435-36. 
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of the initial drafters of the Japanese Constitution were young 
American soldiers. 73 But Japanese politicians also played an 
active role in drafting the Constihltion, and subsequently 
modifying it during intemal debates. 74 As argued elsewhere, the 
Japanese side played a critical role in nanowing the protective 
ambit of the Constitution. 75 Though others have ably excavated 
the many sessions and negotiations comprising the drafting 
process/6 this section focuses on the ethnic implications of those 
debates. 
In the initial draft, SCAP included two provisions to 
expansively protect human rights in the Japanese Constitution.77 
Both provisions were significantly nanowed by the Japanese 
side.78 One article read, "[a]ll natural persons are equal before the 
law. No disc1imination shall be authorized or tolerated in 
political, economic or social relations on account of race, creed, 
sex or social status, caste, or national origin." 79 This is an 
extraordinarily broad set of protections-far broader than those 
enjoyed by Americans at the time-that would reach not only 
young Americans and other foreigners residing in Japan, but also 
Ainu, Koreans, Chinese, Taiwanese, Okinawans, and others. 80 
Over the course of negotiation and translation from English to 
Japanese (and back again), the subject of the nondiscrimination 
provision shrank from "all nah1ral persons" to "all people" in 
English and "all citizens" in Japanese. 81 It is unclear whether 
SCAP appreciated the linguistic differences between "all people" 
and "all citizens," but it is clear from the historical record that the 
Japanese side wanted to diminish the Constitution's protective 
73 See id. 
74 See id. at 442. 
75 Jd. 
76 See, e.g., RAYMOORE&DONALDROBINSON, PARTNERSFORDEMOCRACY(2002). 
This book outlines the entire history of the Japanese constitutional drafting process, 
including the "marathon session" which changed some of the language pertaining to the 
rights of foreigners. See id. at 129-130. 
77 Webster, supra note 69, at 443. The MacArthur Draft specifically extended 
basic rights to "Japanese subjects and to all persons within Japanese jurisdiction." ld. 
78 Jd. 
79 Id. (emphasis added). 
80 See id. 
81 Id. at 443-44. 
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ambit and succeeded in doing so.82 In addition, one ofthe bases-
nationality-was scrapped from the list of protected categories.83 
This alteration helped establish a constitutional regime that 
protects Japanese citizens, but no one else, which is essentially 
how the Japanese Constitution reads today. 
A second provision read, "[a ]liens shall be entitled to the equal 
protection of law," 84 but the Japanese side questioned the 
necessity of protecting aliens and decided to remove this provision 
in its entirety. 85 Aliens enjoy no rights under the Japanese 
Constitution. 86 While this is not necessarily different from many 
other constitutions, the removal of aliens is important because the 
American side intended to protect aliens, and the Japanese side 
resisted this move by narrowly circumscribing legal protections.87 
The exclusion of non-Japanese was no abenation, but part of a 
coordinated policy to expel ethnic others-particularly resident 
Koreans-from the Japanese body politic. 88 Even before the 
drafting of the Constitution, the Japanese government expressed 
its views on the presence of non-Japanese in Japan. 89 A 1945 
amendment to the Election Law90 nullified the right to vote, and 
82 Jd. at 447-48. 
83 Webster, supra note 69, at 444. 
84 Jd. at 443. 
85 Jd. at 444-45 (describing the process by which "all natural persons" became "all 
citizens"). In addition, the Japanese side changed the protected base of "nationality" into 
"family lineage," which moves the issue away from nationality, and towards class, status 
and family background. I d. at 444. 
86 See id. In the 1977 McLean decision, the Supreme Court of Japan detem1ined 
that aliens in Japan enjoy equal constitutional rights as citizens of Japan, save for those 
rights that "by their nature" should not apply to aliens (such as the right to vote, the right 
to serve in political office, etc.). I d. at 449. 
87 See id. at 445; see also lwasawa, supra note 60, at 146 ("Japan should not have 
deprived all Koreans of their Japanese nationality unilaterally based on [their] koseki 
(family registry) system, but should have referred to the nationality laws of Korea and 
given to those Korean residents who wished to select Japanese nationality a chance to do 
so."). 
88 See Kim, supra note 38, at 56. 
89 See id. The drafting began in January 1946, with the American and Japanese 
side conducting their most vigorous debates in February and March 1946. I d. The Diet 
debated the Constitution over the summer of 1946, before promulgating it in November 
1946. Webster, supra note 69, at 441-442. 
90 Election Law, Law No. 42 of 1945 (suspending the electoral eligibility of 
persons not covered by the Family Registry Act). 
570 N.C. I. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [V o 1. x.--;cxvr 
the right to run for office, of persons not covered by Japan's 
family registry, namely resident Koreans and Taiwanese. 91 Just 
months after surrender, Japan was already seeking to limit the 
legal rights of ethnic minorities by prohibiting their participation 
in politics. 92 Suffrage and electoral eligibility are two key 
chmmels for people, including minorities, to express their voice on 
national debates and to influence policy and legislation. Both 
channels were severed by this amendment. 
In May 1947, the Cabinet also weighed in on the debate.93 An 
Alien Registration Ordinance94 stipulated that "in the application 
of this Ordinance Taiwanese and Koreans shall be deemed, for the 
time being, as aliens."95 After disenfranchising resident Koreans 
and Taiwanese, the next step was to alienate them, that is, to 
subject them to alien registration procedures: annual registration, 
periodic fingerprinting, and the obligation to carry one's alien 
registration card at all times. 96 Most Koreans and Taiwanese 
retumed to their newly independent homelands after the war,97 yet 
many remained in Japan. For several years in the late 1940s, the 
number of aliens registered in Japan hovered around 640,000, 
some 600,000 of whom were Korean. 98 
It was only in 1952, just prior to the effectuation of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty,99 that the legal determination of resident 
Koreans and Taiwanese took final fonn. 100 In April, the Ministry 
of Justice issued a circular, stripping all ethnic Koreans and 
Taiwanese of their Japanese nationality. 101 One way to interpret 
these events is to suggest that since Japan no longer maintained 
control over Korean and Taiwanese territory, why should its 
91 Kim, supra note 38, at 56. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
94 Alien Registration Ordinance, Order No. 207 of 1947, Art. II. 
95 !d. 
96 See id. at 58-59. 
97 See id. at 55. 
98 !d. at 57. 
99 Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951,3 U.S.T. 3!69. The Treaty went into 
effect on April28, 1952. 
100 See Iwasawa, supra note 60, at 144. 
101 See id. 
r 
! 
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government bestow the benefits of citizenship on people who 
came therefrom? To be sure, resident Korean and Taiwanese 
residents of Japan could have naturalized through standard 
Japanese immigration processes, but they would have had to shed 
their original name, take on a Japanese name, and submit their 
applications to the discretionary selection processes of the 
Ministry of Justice. 102 As a matter of law, resident Koreans and 
Taiwanese were hencefmih aliens, subject to a new legal 
framework, including the hmnigration Control Act 103 and Alien 
Registration Ordinance. 104 
The Alien Registration Law imposed numerous restrictions on 
the Korean and Taiwanese minorities. 105 For instance, they had to 
register as aliens, renew their registration every three years, carry 
their registration card at all times, and present it when requested 
by a police officer.106 When renewing their registration, resident 
Koreans and Taiwanese had to be fingerprinted, which many 
considered offensive given the criminal connotations of 
fingerprinting. 107 They were excluded from social welfare 
programs that require Japanese nationality, 108 and they were 
denied the opportunity to work in many civil service positions that 
involve the "exercise of public authority or the formation of public 
will." 109 Such a constraint may seem appropriate for positions 
where exercise of state sovereignty is implicated, such as 
diplomatic service, or service as prime minister, 110 but this 
102 See Kim, supra note 38, at 65. 
103 See id. at 57-58 (discussing the Immigration Control Act, Cabinet Order No. 319 
of1951). 
104 The Alien Registration Law was promulgated on the same day that the Peace 
Treaty took effect: April 28, 1952. Id. Law No. 125 of 1952. The message from the 
Japanese government was clear: having lost the former colonies by virtue of the Peace 
Treaty, we hereby renounce any responsibility to the people we colonized. See Kim, 
supra note 38, at 58. 
105 See Kim, supra note 3 8, at 61. 
106 Id. 
107 See Bryant, supra note 62, at 126. 
108 Kim, supra note 38, at 61. 
109 Id. 
110 Only one Japanese law specifically requires citizenship for employment: the 
Diplomat Law. Temki Tsunemoto, Rights & Identities of Ethnic Minorities in Japan: 
Indigenous Ainu and Resident Koreans, 2 ASIA-PAC. J. HUM. RTS. & L. 119, 137 (2001). 
Yet the government maintains that citizenship is necessary for positions where one 
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regulation also prohibits resident Koreans and Taiwanese from 
teaching in public schools, delivering the mail, and working as 
nurses in public hospitals. 111 In a controversial 2005 decision, the 
Supreme Court of Japan upheld a Tokyo ordinance that prevented 
a resident Korean nurse from working in a public hospital. 112 
Policies from half a century ago continue to be relevant in the 
present. As we shall see in the next part, resident Koreans have 
mounted a host of legal challenges to various aspects of the legal 
framework governing permanent aliens, with varying degrees of 
success. 113 In these suits, international human rights law provides 
essential legal and normative bases for their claims. 114 
D. Contemporary Japan (1980 to present) 
By 1992, 1.3 million registered foreigners lived in Japan, about 
one percent of the total Japanese population. 115 About 35% of 
these were so-called special permanent residents, mainly Koreans 
(and some Chinese), mostly descended from the migrants who 
entered Japan during the colonial period from 1895-1945. 116 
One of the most explicitly racialized policies of recent vintage 
is the 1990 revision of the Immigration Control and Refugee 
Recognition Act. 117 In the 1980s, as Japan became the second 
largest economy in the world, migrants from Asia flocked to Japan 
exercises public authority or participates in formulating policy. ld at 137-38. 
111 Kim, supra note 38, at 61. 
112 Webster, supra note 69, at 451-53. Thirteen of fifteen Justices agreed that 
Tokyo had a "rational basis" to distinguish foreigners from citizens in appointing local 
civil servants. ld. at 453. The Tokyo District Court agreed with this ruling, finding that 
"the Constitution does not guarantee foreigners the right to employment as a civil 
servant." !d. at 452. The Tokyo High Court reversed, holding that employing foreigners 
in certain civil service positions would not infringe upon national sovereignty, but the 
Supreme Court overturned the appellate court's ruling by discerning a rational basis in 
the city policy. Jd. at 453. 
113 YUJI IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS AND JAPANESE LAW 150 
( 1998). 
114 ld. 
115 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, Cabinet Order No. 319 of 
1951, translation available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku!houreildata/icrra.pdf. 
116 ld. 
117 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, Cabinet Order No. 319 of 
1951, translation available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku!hourei/data/icrra.pdf. 
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to perform unskilled labor, often illegally.118 Higher up the value 
chain, skilled workers were needed to supply Japan with the talent 
necessary to compete globally. 119 The immigration law was 
revised to respond to these fluctuations, responding in three main 
ways. First, the law broadened the scope of legal employment in 
which certain skilled and professional foreigners could engage. 120 
Second, it introduced penalties against employers that illegally 
employed foreign workers, and against brokers that found jobs for 
them. 121 Third, it pennitted descendants of overseas Japanese-
primarily in Brazil and Peru-to work in Japan with no job 
restrictions, for up to three years. 122 In effect, this opened up the 
unskilled labor market to the Japanese diaspora and closed it to the 
South Asians, East Asians, Southeast Asians, and others who had 
been working in Japan during the 1980s. 123 The Japanese 
govemment accepted almost 200,000 ethnically Japanese workers 
and effectively excluded all other unskilled laborers. 124 
Though etlmically Japanese, most Japanese-Brazilians and 
Japanese-Peruvians experience a completely different language, 
culture and society upon touching down in Japan. Nevertheless, 
their presence in Japan highlights official concem with 
maintaining ethnic homogeneity in the face of cultural diversity. 125 
It is unlikely that many Japanese citizens would actually encounter 
Japanese Latinos, who are normally concentrated in company 
housing and bused to their jobs through company transportation. 126 
The Japanese physiognomies sought by the national govemment 
remain largely invisible to the populace. 
A final note touches on Japan's refugee policy. It would be 
ll8 Yoko Sellek, Nikkeijin: The Phenomenon of Return Migration, in JAPAN's 
MINORITIES: THE ILLUSION OF HOMOGENEITY 178, 182-83 (Michael Weiner ed., 1997). 
ll9 See id. at 183-84. 
120 ld. at 183. 
121 ld. at 183-84; see also Timothy Webster, Reconstituting Japanese Law: 
International Norms and Domestic Litigation, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 211, 214 (2008) 
(discussing the creation of penalties for employers hiring illegal workers and for 
individuals who help employers find illegal labor). 
122 Webster, supra note 121, at 214-15. 
123 See id. at 215. 
124 Sellek, supra note 118, at 202. 
125 See id. 
126 See id. at 200. 
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unfair to evaluate a country's openness to ethnic others solely by 
looking at its treatment of refugees. But refugee policy can reflect 
attitudes towards foreigners and international commitments to 
provide for stateless people. In this respect, Japan has gone from a 
policy of refusing asylum-seekers for the first part of the postwar 
period (1945 to 1978), to one of grudging acceptance of a small 
number of refugees since it ratified the Refugee Convention in 
1981. 127 
Criticism of the tightly circumscribed nature of Japan's 
refugee regime has been widespread. 128 Even after ratifying the 
Refugee Convention, Japan has been loath to accept asylum-
seekers; in each year from 1989 to 1997, the number of 
acceptances never exceeded single-digits. 129 From 1998 to 2004, 
acceptances averaged around twenty per year. 130 And while 
numbers have increased slightly since then, it is fair to conclude 
that Japan has not been a major destination country for refugees. 
With this slight uptick in acceptances, however, has also been an 
increased willingness by comis to appeal decisions rendered by 
the Ministry of Justice, and grant asylum. l3l This will be more 
fully explored in the next section. 
127 See RYUJI !vlUKAE, JAPAN'S REFUGEE POLICY: To BE OF THE WORLD 137-38, 149-
50 (200 1 ). 
128 See, e.g., 0SAMU ARAKAIU, REFUGEE LAW AND PRACTICE IN JAPAN 233 (2008) 
("Japan's refugee determination system conflicts with any reasonable understanding of 
the notions of fair decision-makers and fair procedure. Under the present Japanese 
determination system, it is difficult to believe that accurate and fair decisions can be 
assured."); Akashi Junichi, Challenging Japan's Refugee Policies, 15 ASIAN & PAC. 
MIGRATION J. 219, 221 (2006) ("Many existing studies and commentaries on Japan's 
refugee policy are inclined to take a critical attitude toward Japanese society or 
government for falling short of complying with international humanitarian regimes."); 
MUT<AE, supra note 127, at 242 ("In a nutshell, Japan's isolationist asylum (and more 
generally immigration) policy has been construed and in fact used in order to defend 
Japan's putative national cultural/etlmic pmity and hence its economic prosperity and 
public safety. Obviously, Japan, as a major economic power, cannot get away with 
keeping such an exclusionist attitude in this increasingly interdependent world."). 
129 ARAI<AKI, supra note 128, at 27; Junichi, supra note 128, at 219. 
!30 See ARAI<AIU, supra note 128, at 27. 
131 Iwasawa Yftji, Nihonni okeru Ko!atsai Nanminh6 no Kaishaku Tekiy6 [The 
Inte1pretation and Application of International Reji1gee Law in Japan], 1321 JURISUTO 
16, 18 (2006). 
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II. Cases: Litigation Challenges Disparate or Unfair 
Treatment 
575 
We have examined how over time the Japanese state has 
promoted the interests of ethnic Japanese over those of various 
minority groups. Given the demographic dominance of ethnic 
Japanese citizens in Japan, minorities encounter serious obstacles 
in protecting themselves through political processes. 132 A group 
numbering in the tens of thousands (like the Ainu), or even in the 
hundreds of thousands (like resident Koreans), does not count for 
much in a country with 125 million people. 133 Moreover, 
pennanent residents and temporary residents ca1111ot vote in 
national elections and in most local elections, eliminating one 
common cham1el to voice grievances. 134 
Lawsuits, on the other hand, offer one way through which 
dispossessed minorities can challenge laws that inure to their 
detriment. Since the laws in many cases do not provide for causes 
of action, minority plaintiffs often cite international human rights 
law to lend additional moral, legal, or nonnative weight to their 
claims. 135 Several kinds of cases illuminate the ways that 
international law has served to challenge the Japanese ethno-state. 
This section focuses on three cases that conespond to the general 
132 With a population of less than 2%, only a fraction of which are citizens of Japan 
(and hence voters in national elections), minorities have a difficult time availing 
themselves of political processes. See Registered foreign population in Japan hits 
record-high 2.21 million, JAPAN TODAY, July 11, 2009, 
http://www.japantoday.com/category/nationallview/registered-foreign-population-in-
japan-hits-record-high-221-million. 
133 John Lie, relying on Japanese sources, puts the number of Ainu at 24,000, 
though the number of people with Ainu ancestry could easily exceed that number by a 
factor of ten. JoHN LIE, supra note 25, at 94. The Economist fixes the number of 
resident Koreans at 406,000. See A foreigner in her own home: Shoddy treatment of its 
Korea residents once again deals Japan a black eye, ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 2011, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/18338862. 
!34 See Miles J. Hawks, Translation and Comment, Granting Permanent Resident 
Aliens the Right to Vote in Local Government: T11e New Komeito Continues to Promote 
Alien Suffi·age in Japan, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 369, 370-71 (2007)(noting that only 
Japanese citizens can vote in national elections, but local governments are currently 
considering provisions to allow permanent residents the right to vote). 
135 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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types of minorities in contemporary Japan. 136 The first type of 
case concerns Japan's Ainu population by analyzing an important 
decision from 1997, showing how international human rights law 
expanded the scope of applicable law and led judges to hold an 
administrative taking illegal under domestic and international law. 
The second type of case involves a cluster of challenges brought 
by resident Koreans to two of Japan's policies on resident aliens: 
the fingerprinting regime and the refusal to grant various forms of 
welfare. 137 The third type of case addresses the absence of 
domestic protections for discrimination in the private sphere, 
rather than any particular enacted law or policy. While it may 
seem unfair to focus on the absence of law, I argue that this lacuna 
is significant as the result of the Diet's failure to pass protective 
legislation. 
A. Ainu 
The Ainu people represent a tiny subpopulation within Japan. 
By one estimate, approximately 24,000 Japanese self-identify as 
Ainu, though many more can trace their lineage back to Ainu 
ancest1y. 138 As with indigenous populations in other countries, 139 
the Ainu face various socioeconomic challenges in their 
encounters with mainstream society: they are twice as likely to 
receive welfare as the average Japanese citizen, yet less than half 
136 This typology is modified slightly from David L. Howell, Ethnicity and Culture 
in Contempora/y Japan, in 1 RACE, ETHNICITY AND MIGRATION IN MODERN JAPAN 103 
(Michael Weiner ed., 2004). Howell divides Japan's minorities into native minorities 
(Ainu, Olcinawans, and Buralcumin), Koreans brought to Japan during World War II and 
their descendants, and recent immigrants from Asia and Latin America. !d. at 104. This 
article narrows the focus of the first category to examine only one group of natives: the 
Ainu people. I do this because of the long period of acculturation policy that the 
Japanese state directed at the Ainu, and because, so far as I can tell, Okinawans and 
Burakumin have not used international human 1ights law to bolster their legal claims. 
Conversely, this article expands the focus of category three to include other recent 
immigrants from the United States and Europe. 
137 See infra, Parts II.C.1, II.C.2. 
138 Tsunemoto, supra note 110, at 120. 
139 For example, only eighteen percent of Native Americans aged eighteen to 
twenty-four enroll in college, while forty-two percent of whites aged eighteen to twenty-
four enroll in college. Michelle J. Nealy, Chronicling the Lives of Native Americans on 
Predominantly White Campuses, DrvERSE: ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION (Mar. 4, 2009), 
http:/ I diverseeducation. com/article/12362/. 
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as likely to attend university. 140 Since the 1980s, as indigenous 
rights movements have sprung up in other areas of the globe, the 
Ainu too have launched a movement to establish their ethnic 
identity and secure certain indigenous rights.141 
The minority status of the Ainu in Japan has been contested 
since at least 1980, when Japan, in its first periodic report to the 
U.N. Human Rights Cmmnittee, stated that the Japanese 
Constitution supports "[t]he right of any person to enjoy his own 
culture, to profess and practice his own religion or to use his own 
language .... However, minorities of the kind mentioned in the 
Covenant do not exist in Japan." 142 This statement reflects an 
official view of etlmic differences in Japan, or rather their absence, 
while providing an important starting point for official discussions 
about the recognition of minority culture. In a later periodic 
repmi, the Japanese government aclmowledged that under Article 
27 of the Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
("ICCPR"), 143 the Ainu constituted a minority, 144 yet the 
government has been unwilling to officially recognize the Ainu as 
an indigenous minority. 145 This is perhaps out of fear that such 
recognition would validate, and possibly increase, claims for self-
determination by the Ainu. 
A degree of self-detennination was at the hemi of a lawsuit 
140 See Tsunemoto, supra note 110, at 121. 
141 Jd. at 121-22. 
142 United Nations Human Rights Committee [hereinafter UNHRC], Consideration 
of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Initial Reports 
of States Parties Due in 1980 (Japan), 12th Sess., Oct. 24, 1980, art. 27, UN Doc. 
CCPRJC/10/Add. 1 (Nov. 14, 1980). 
143 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 179 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
144 UNCHR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by the States Parties In 
Accordance with Article 40 of the Covenant: Third Periodic Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1991 (Japan), Dec.l6, 1991, ~ 233, UN Doc. CCPRJC/70/Add. 1 (March 30, 
1992). 
145 See UNHCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee 
(Japan), 94th Sess., Oct. 13-31, 2008, ~ 32, U.N. Doc. CCPRJC/JPN/C0/5 (Dec. 18, 
2008) ("The State party should expressly recognize the Ainu and Ryukyu/Okinawa as 
indigenous peoples in domestic legislation, adopt special measures to protect, preserve 
and promote their cultural heritage and traditional way of life, and recognize their land 
rights."). 
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filed in 1993 by two members of the Ainu minority. 146 The pair 
sued a Japanese administrative agency for approving a dam that 
eventually flooded lands sacred to the Ainu. 147 In a strongly 
worded 1997 decision, the Sapporo District Court found the 
Minister of Constmction, who was ultimately responsible for the 
approval, had not sufficiently investigated the case and had failed 
to understand the harm done to the Ainu. 148 But since the dam had 
already flooded the religious site, and would require great expense 
to remove, the court deployed the "public welfare" exception to 
conclude that the dam could remain where it was. 149 
In concluding that the Ainu were an ethnic minority deserving 
of protection, the court relied heavily on international law, 
primarily the ICCPR, but also the International Labor 
Organization ("ILO") Convention on Indigenous People. 150 The 
judgment recognized that the Ainu were an ethnic minority under 
the ICCPR. 151 Moreover, the Ainu constituted an "indigenous 
people" that retained a unique culture and identity, "even after 
suffering enorn1ous social and economic devastation wrought by 
policies adopted by the [ethnic Japanese] majority. " 152 In light of 
the comments made to the Human Rights Committee a decade 
before, this recognition represents real progress. 
Plaintiffs cited Article 27 of the ICCPR, which provides that 
minorities "shall not be denied the right ... to enjoy their own 
culh1re."153 Though this provision imposes a negative obligation 
upon member states (not to deny the right), the Japanese court 
found "a positive obligation" 154 upon Japan to "exercise due 
146 Levin, supra note 41, at 399-400. 
147 Jd. 
148 Jd. at 398-99, 403. 
149 Id. at 429. 
150 E.g., International Labour Organization, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention, opened for signature June 27, 1989,28 LL.M. 1384 (entered into force Sept. 
5, 1991); Levin, supra note 41, at 418; International Labour Organization, Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples Convention, opened for signature June 27, 1989, 28 LL.M. 1384 
(entered into force Sept. 5, 1991 ). 
151 Levin, supra note 41, at 418. 
!52 Id. at 422. 
153 ICCPR, supra note 143, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179. 
154 Tokushiro Ohata & Takahide Nagata, Illegality of the Expropriation of Ainu 
Land in View of Their Rights As an Indigenous People, 18 WASEDA BULL. CaMP. L. 99, 
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care ... when deciding upon, or executing, national policies that 
risk adversely affecting a minority's culture."155 This amounts to a 
fairly robust reading of Article 27, which is otherwise plu·ased 
quite passively. In no uncertain ten11s, the court held that the 
Japanese Ministry of Culture failed to exercise due care 111 
reviewing matetials that authorized the dam. 156 The Minister 
"neglected the investigative and research procedures that 
were necessary to judge the priority of the competing 
interests; . . . umeasonably made little of and ignored 
various factors and values that should have been given the 
highest regard; [and] . . . recognized only the smallest 
possible impact on Ainu culture and left any damages 
thereupon umemedied."157 
While decrying the Minister's neglect, the comi did not offer 
compensation for the authorization, and indeed permitted the dam 
to reach completion.158 Still, in cataloguing the various misdeeds 
of the Minister, and importing various notions about the rights of 
indigenous people, the court fulfilled international legal 
obligations to protect human rights. One can tightly dispute the 
nature of the remedy ordered-essentially a slap on the wrist of 
the Ministry-but the influence of international law in judicial 
reasoning was impressive and still relatively scarce, up until that 
point, in Japanese jurisprudence.159 
103 (1997) (Japan). 
155 Levin, supra note 41, at 418. 
156 I d. at 427. 
157 Jd. 
158 ld. at 429. 
159 See generally Timothy Webster, international Human Rights Law In Japan: The 
~iew at Thirty, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 241, 243 (2010) (describing the Japanese 
JUdiciary's awakening to the international human rights law in the 1990s). 
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B. Ethnic and Racial Discrimination160 Lawsuits 
In a stiing of racial discrimination lawsuits brought in the past 
decade, courts have had ample opportunity to use intemational 
human rights law to correct domestic law, or more accurately, to 
correct the absence of domestic law. 161 In 2003, the Japanese Diet 
debated, but failed to pass, a human rights protection bill that 
would make illegal much of the conduct at issue in these cases, 
such as discrimination by real estate agents, shopkeepers, bar 
owners, and providers of services. 162 It has been subsequently 
resubmitted, but failed to find the necessary political support 
among members of the Diet. 163 For the time being, victims of 
racial and ethnic discrimination will have to look beyond Japan's 
domestic legislation, and the political processes that create it, to 
fashion their arguments. 
The issue of racial discrimination in the private sphere is not 
new in Japan. Resident Koreans challenged employment 
discrimination in the 1970s 164 and housing discrimination in the 
160 The differences between race and etlmicity are complex and beyond the scope of 
this inquiry. For purposes of this paper, cases of etlmic discrimination refer to lawsuits 
brought by resident Koreans, etlmic Chinese, or other East Asians whose physical 
appearance would not permit immediate differentiation from the "typical" Japanese 
physiognomy. Cases of racial discrimination refer to cases brought by whites, African-
Americans, Latinos, South Asians, and others whose physical appearance is 
distinguishable from the typical Japanese. 
161 See Timothy Webster, Reconstructing Japanese Law: International Norms and 
Domestic Legislation, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 211, 245 (2008) (describing the absence of 
Japanese law on racial discrimination). 
162 !d. at 247. Certain forms of discriminatory behavior, such as differential 
treatment in wages and working conditions, were proscribed by the Labor Standards Act. 
See Labor Standards Act, Law No. 49 of 1947, arts. 3, 4 (Japan). But this act does not 
address discrimination in hiring, nor discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, 
or ethnicity. See id. 
163 See Webster, supra note 161, at 248 (stating the human rights protection bill was 
resubmitted in 2005). With the change of political power in September 2009, it is 
conceivable that the more liberal Democratic Party of Japan may resubmit the bill. See 
Japan NGO Network for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, NGOs 
Answers to the Questions by the Rapporteur in Connection with the Consideration of the 
Third to Sixth Periodic Reports of Japan (CERD/C/JPN/3-6), 17 (Feb. 3, 201 0) available 
at http://www2.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/cerd/docs/ngos/SNMJ _Answers _Japan _76.doc. 
164 See Pak Chong-sok v. Hitachi, 744 HANREI Jm6 29 (Yokohama Dist. Ct., June 
19, 1974). 
h ~ 
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1980s. 165 However, a 1998 decision rendered by the Shizuoka 
District Court has reinvigorated racial discrimination lawsuits. 166 
In this case, a Japanese owner of a jewelry store expelled a 
Brazilian woman from his store because she was a foreigner, 
which she believed was an illegal violation of her human rights. 167 
The court agreed with her claim, ordered compensation for the 
plaintiff, and relied heavily on the International Convention to End 
All Forms ofRacial Discrimination ("CERD") in so doing. 168 This 
set an important, although unbinding precedent for future victims 
of racial discrimination in the private sphere. 
In his judgment, Judge Soh Tetsuro fashioned a tort remedy 
out of international and constitutional law. 169 He did not 
specifically examine the issue of whether CERD had direct or 
indirect effect, but simply noted that, "CERD is beneath the 
Constitution, but still has effect in this country as domestic law."170 
In his analysis, Judge Soh focused on a comment made by the 
Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the CERD Committee that 
Japan did not need to take "[n]ew legislative measures ... to 
effectuate this treaty."171 The official posited that Japan's existing 
legal system could handle racial discrimination in the private 
sphere without implementing additional legislation. 172 The judge 
disagreed, asking rhetorically, "do we dare think that legislative 
measures and budgetary measures will not be necessary [to 
adequately safeguard these rights]?" 173 By and large, Japanese 
judges defer to the decisions and statements of the political 
branches, 174 so this amounted to a fairly strong judicial rebuke 
both to the executive (for its statement) and to the legislature (for 
165 See Pe v. Kitaura, 1468 HANREJ JIH6 122 (Osaka Dist. Ct., June 18, 1993). 
166 Bortz v. Suzuki, 1045 HANREI TAJMUZU 216 (Shizuoka Dist. Ct., Oct. 12, 1999), 
translated in Timothy Webster, Bortz v. Suzuzki, Judgment of October 12, 1999, 
Hamamatsu Branch, Shizuoka District Court, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL 'y J. 631 (2007). 
167 Webster, supra note 166, at 631-32. 
168 1d. 
169 1d. 
170 1d. at 651. 
171 1d. at 651 (alteration in original). 
172 Webster, supra note 166, at 631-32. 
173 1d. at 652 (emphasis added). 
174 See Webster, supra note 161, at 260. 
" I 
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failing to pass a racial discrimination law). Indeed, the nature and 
discursiveness of this opinion suggest that the judge aimed to send 
a message. 175 CERD urges states to pass laws banning racial 
discrimination by private persons, 176 and if the state fails to do so, 
it states that courts are the appropriate venue to handle the 
dispute. 177 As the verdict states, 
CERD goes one step farther [than the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights] by requiring signatories to 
take legislative and other measures to deal with individual 
and group acts of racial discrimination. 
This means that if an act of racial discrimination 
violated a provision of CERD, and the state or organization 
did not take the measures that it should have, then one 
could, in accordance with Article 6 of CERD, at the very 
least seek compensation for damages, or take other 
measures for relief, against the state or organization due to 
the omission. 178 
Article 6 of CERD guarantees victims of racial discrimination 
"effective protection and remedies, through the competent national 
tribunals." 179 If Japan does not pass laws to proscribe 
discriminatory conduct, either nationally or locally, 180 this absence 
cannot inoculate racist behavior. 
To fill the gap in legislation, Judge Soh used CERD's 
prohibition on racial discrimination by third pmiies 181 as an 
interpretive aid (or "interpretive standard"182 in Japanese parlance) 
175 The opinion is also noteworthy for its didactic introduction to the history of 
human rights, from Confucius and Mencius to Martin Luther and World War II. See 
Webster, supra note 166, at 652-53, 656. Needless to say, such a historical introduction 
would be rare in most jurisdictions. 
176 See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination art. 2(l)(d), Dec. 21, 1965,660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD] (stating 
that "Each State Party shall prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, 
including legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, 
group or organization."). 
177 /d. art. 6. 
178 Webster, supra note 166, at 652. 
179 CERD, supra note 176, art. 6. 
180 To this day, Japan has not passed a law proscribing discriminatory conduct at 
either national or local levels. See Webster, supra note 161, at 250. 
181 CERD, supra note 176, art. 2(1)(d). 
182 Webster, supra note 166, at 652. 
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to detennine that the storeowner's expulsion was illegal. 183 By 
denying plaintiff access to services held out to the general public, 
the storeowner celiainly violated Article 5(f) of CERD,184 even if 
no domestic law was violated. In so doing, Judge Soh seems to 
have applied Article 6 of CERD, which empowers national 
tribunals to adjudicate disputes and award compensation. 185 By 
awarding damages and finding an illegal act-the tort of racial 
discrimination-Judge Soh provides both process and 
compensation for the dispute. 186 To reiterate, the opinion does not 
say it is directly applying CERD, but seems to achieve as much by 
finding liability and ordering compensation anyway. 
Many subsequent cases also applied CERD in this way. 
Japanese comis apply intemational human rights law between 
private citizens by citing to CERD as an "interpretative 
standard."187 Several coulis have held that private acts of racial 
discrimination (rejecting people from public places, golf clubs, 
stores, house rentals, and bars) are "illegal," and have ordered 
compensation accordingly, even in the absence of directly 
applicable domestic law. 188 This "personalization" of intemational 
law suggests that intemational human rights law can meaningfully 
gap-fill in Japan's umegulated private sector and may even be able 
to influence private persons' behavior. 189 
Over the years, coulis have taken a relatively unified stance in 
applying CERD to private paliies, reading intemational law 
through the language of domestic toli law. 190 The Sapporo District 
Comi spelled out this process a bit more elaborately: 
Article 14(1) of the Constitution, the ICCPR, and CERD 
183 Jd. at 631-32. 
184 CERD, supra note 176, art. 5(f). CERD guarantees "right of access to any place 
or service intended for use by the general public, such as transport, hotels, restaurants, 
cafes, theatres and parks." Jd. (emphasis added). 
185 Jd. art. 6. 
186 Webster, supra note 166, at 631-32. 
187 Arudouv.Earth Cure,ll50 HANRE1TAIMUZU185(Sapporo D. Ct.,Nov.11, 
2002), translated in Timothy Webster, Arudou v. Earth Cure: Judgment of November 
11, 2002, Sapporo District Court, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & PoL'Y J. 297, 298 & n.5 (2008). 
188 See generally Webster, supra note 159 (outlining how Japanese comis have 
turned to international human rights law to address racial discrimination). 
189 Jd. at 260. 
190 Jd. at 260-61. 
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do not apply directly to relations between private persons. 
But if private conduct specifically violates, or risks 
violating, another person's basic rights or equality, these 
provisions can be used to evaluate social norms. Articles 1 
and 90 of the Civil Code, 191 among others, generally 
regulate private autonomy, and protect an individual's 
interests against illegal infringements of basic rights and 
equality. Thus, Article 14(1) of the Constitution, the 
ICCPR, and CERD can serve as one standard in 
inte1preting the above provisions of private law. 192 
Cases such as these suggest that international law-even when 
not accompanied by relevant domestic law-can advance human 
rights in important areas that domestic law, and the political 
process, may leave untouched. 
C. Resident Koreans 
The third type of case involves Japan's resident Korean 
population, which has comprised its largest ethnic minority 
presence for most of the postwar period. 193 At present, some 
600,000 resident Koreans live in Japan, most of them descended 
from those who immigrated to Japan during the colonial period. 194 
They do not possess Japanese citizenship, which in tum subjects 
them to various forms of discrimination by state and private 
actors. 195 In light of the weak protections offered by domestic law, 
resident Koreans often tum to international human 1ights law to 
protect their rights. 196 
191 Article 1 of the Civil Code requires that rights and obligations shall be 
performed "in good faith." MINP6 [Crv. C.], ati. 1 (Japan). Article 90 proscribes acts 
that are "against public policy." !d. art. 90. The latter provision is commonly used in 
cases where a person discriminates against another, for example, on the basis of gender. 
See Hidenori Tomatsu, Equal Protection of the Law, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 
114 (1990). 
1n Webster, supra note 159, at 317 (emphasis added). The court went on to note 
that Yunohana's conduct amounted to "discrimination based on race, skin color, descent, 
ethnic origin or racial migin. In light of the meaning of Aliicle 14(1) of the Constitution, 
Article 26 of the ICCPR, and CERD, these amount to private acts of racial 
discrimination that ought to be eliminated." !d. at 317-18. 
193 IWASAWA, supra note 113, 123. 
194 Id. at 123-25. 
195 Id. at 125. 
196 Id. at 123-24. 
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Two clusters of cases in particular have cited numerous 
intemational human rights instruments: those challenging Japan's 
restrictive residency requirements and those challenging exclusive 
pension laws. First, for several decades, resident Koreans had to 
be fingerprinted whenever they renewed their alien registration 
cards or retumed to Japan after traveling abroad. 197 Through a 
series of lawsuits in the 1980s and early 1990s, resident Koreans 
challenged the necessity and legality of the fingerprinting regime, 
which was ultimately repealed in 1993. 198 Many of their 
challenges were based on the prohibition on degrading treatment 
found in the ICCPR. 199 Second, resident Koreans have routinely 
cited international human rights law to prod the Japanese 
government to provide them with pensions?00 Japan significantly 
revised its pension laws in the early 1980s, after ratifying the 
Refugee Convention, 201 but many resident Koreans were still 
excluded from disability pensions, military pensions and old age 
pensions due to loopholes in the revised pension system.202 They 
have appealed to the Intemational Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights\ ("ICESCR")203 in order to protect the right to 
social insurance.204 
I. Finge1printing 
After denationalization in 1952, resident Koreans and 
Taiwanese became aliens in Japan, and henceforth subject to its 
Alien Registration Law.205 Under this system, they had to have 
their fingerprints taken on a registration card, a registration 
certificate, and a fingerprint card, once every five years. 206 
197 Jd. at 150. 
198 lWASAWA, supra note 113, 151 & n.102. 
199 Jd. at 151. 
200 Jd. at 171. 
201 Jd. 
202 Id. at 172. 
203 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR], available at 
http :I /www2. ohchr. org/English/law/ cescr .htm. 
204 lWASAWA, supra note 113, 172-73. 
205 Jd. at 150. 
206 Jd. at 150. 
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Refusal to submit to this requirement could lead to up to one year 
of imprisonment, or a fine of up to 200,000 yen.207 Needless to 
say, a similar requirement was not imposed on Japanese 
nationals. 208 The fingerprinting regime was gradually loosened 
over the course of the 1980s, and ultimately abolished in 1993.209 
While this abolition came as the result of various political factors, 
including official negotiations between Japan and Korea, 210 a 
series of lawsuits in the 1980s and 1990s added pressure and 
visibility to the cause.211 
For many aliens, the fingerprinting requirement was 
objectionable because of its associations with the criminal process; 
in Japan, as in many other countries, criminals are fingerprinted 
upon atTest. Begitming in the 1980s, resident Koreans refused to 
be fingerprinted upon renewing their registration fonns or 
reentering Japan after traveling abroad. 212 In 1985, some 360,000 
aliens renewed their registrations, but over 10,000 refused to be 
fingerprinted. 213 
In addition to these large-scale protests, a number of resident 
Koreans also launched legal challenges to the fingerprinting 
regime, relying heavily on international law. 214 In an early case, 
the Tokyo District Comi claimed that "to compel fingerprinting 
without just cause or need" could indeed amount to '"degrading 
treatment' stipulated in Article 7 of the ICCPR."215 But since there 
was a reasonable basis for the fingerprinting system-to wit 
"clarifying the residential and family relations of resident 
foreigners"-the court did not find a violation of international 
law.216 
207 Jd. 
208 Jd. 
209 lWASAWA, supra note 113, 154-56. 
210 ld. at 155. 
211 Iwasawa lists half a dozen lawsuits, two of which went as far as the Supreme 
Court. I d. at 151, n.1 02. 
212 Jd. at 150. 
213 Id. at 150. 
214 lWASAWA, supra note 113, at 151. 
215 See, e.g., State of Japan v. Han Jong-seok, Tokyo Chiho Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. 
Ct.], Nov. 29, 1984, 1125 HANREI TAIMUZU 101, 29 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 238, 240 
(1986). 
216 Id. at 245. 
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In another lawsuit filed in 1989, plaintiff Yun Chang-yol 
claimed that the fingerprinting system violated his constitutional 
rights, as well as Articles 7 (degrading treatment) and 26 (non-
discrimination) of the ICCPR.217 The Osaka High Court found the 
fingerprinting system constitutional, even though the Diet had 
abolished the system two years earlier.218 Under international law, 
however, the comi anived at a different conclusion. 219 The 
international law claims pushed the comi to examine a significant 
amount of foreign jurispmdence, including the Tyrer decision 
from the European Court of Human Rights, 220 the East African 
Asian cases of the European Commission of Human Rights,221 and 
various views and General Comments of the Human Rights 
Committee. 222 These materials proved helpful to the Japanese 
comi's conception of "degrading treatment."223 In pmiicular, the 
foreign material instmcted the court that degrading treatment 
involved a certain amount of humiliation beyond that nonnally felt 
from criminal conviction, yet below that felt from torture.224 In the 
end, the court decided that the fingerprinting system did not rise to 
the level of "degrading treatment" as proscribed by Article 7 of the 
ICCPR, though it did caution that "special considerations" were 
necessary when analyzing the treatment of resident aliens." 225 
Concerning the discrimination claim of Article 26 of the 
ICCPR, the court found that there was "room to suspect" that it 
was umeasonable to treat resident aliens differently from Japanese 
citizens as mandated by the fingerprinting system.226 While not a 
217 Yun Chang-yo! v. Japan & Kyoto, Osaka Koto Saibansho [Osaka High Ct.], Oct. 
28,1994,1513 HANREIJIHO 1513,38 JAPANESEANN.lNT'LL. 118, 118 (1995); ICCPR, 
supra note 143, at 26, aJi. 7. 
218 Jd. at 129-33. 
219 Jd. 
220 Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1978). 
221 East African Asians v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4403/70, 78-A Eur. Comm'n 
H.R. Dec. & Rep. (1973). 
222 Office of the High Commissioner, UNHCR, CCPR General Comment No. 15: 
The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant, 11 April 1986, available at 
http://www .unhcr.org/refwor1d/docid/45139acfc.html. 
223 ICCPR, supra note 143, aJi. 7. 
224 Yun Chang-yo!, 38 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. at 130 (emphasis added). 
225 Jd. 
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strong condemnation of the fingerprinting policy, reference to 
international law permitted the court to suggest that a particular 
policy may have been illegal.227 The court was clear that neither 
the ICCPR nor the Constitution was violated, yet the ICCPR 
provided some cover for the court to question the legality and 
sagacity of the fingerprinting system as applied to resident 
aliens. 228 
2. Pension Rights 
One common feature of citizenship, in Japan and elsewhere, is 
the right to access social welfare programs, including pensions. In 
1952, when all resident Koreans were stripped of their Japanese 
citizenship, they also lost the right to access pensions, national 
health insurance, and other entitlements of the welfare state. 229 
Though some Japanese municipalities made health insurance 
available on a local level, not all resident Koreans lived in such 
areas. 230 Not until 1986 were all resident Koreans guaranteed 
national health insurance. 231 
In 1982, upon acceding to the Refugee Convention, Japan 
revised its laws to nullify the nationality requirements for 
pensions. 232 However, the revisions still excluded many resident 
aliens. 233 Resident aliens over the age of thirty-five in 1982 were 
effectively barred because they were unable to make twenty-five 
years of payments by the time they would qualify for old age 
pensions at age sixty. 234 Though an interim measure was later 
passed to cover these people, others remained ineligible for 
pensions, even to this day. 235 For example, persons over sixty 
226 Jd. at 132. The comi also held that "it cannot be denied that doubts are raised, 
with respect to [resident aliens] ... that may give rise to a situation violating Article 13 
and 14 o the Constitution and Article 7 and 26 of the Covenant." Jd. at 132-133. 
227 Jd. at 129-131. 
228 Jd. at 132. 
229 Yun Chang-yo!, 38 JAPANESE ANN. INT'LL. at 130 (emphasis added). 
230 See IWASAWA, supra note 113, at 170. 
231 Jd. 
232 Jd. 
233 Jd. 
234 Jd. at 172. 
235 See IWASAWA, supra note 113, at 170. 
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years of age in 1986 cannot receive old age pensions, while 
persons over twenty years of age in 1982 cannot receive disability 
pensions. 236 
Faced with such loopholes, many resident Koreans have turned 
to Japanese courts, and to international law, to challenge their 
exclusion from Japan's pensions programs. 237 In particular, the 
ICESCR guarantees "the right of everyone to social security, 
including social insurance." 238 Even so, disputes concerning 
disability pensions,239 old age pensions/40 and military pensions241 
have generally not favored plaintiffs. Courts wriggle out of the 
very clear language of the ICESCR by claiming the treaty lacks 
direct effect; in the words of the ICESCR, its obligations are to be 
"achieved progressively." 242 In these cases, 243 Japanese courts 
236 ld. 
237 ld. 
238 ICESCR, supra note 203, art. 9, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7. 
239 Shiomi v. Governor of Osaka, 31 GY6SAISHU 216 (Osaka Dist. Ct. Oct. 29, 
1980), ajf'd 35 GY6SAJSH0 2220 (Osaka High Ct., Dec. 19, 1984), ajf'd 1363 HANREJ 
HH6 68 (S. Ct., Mar. 2, 1989). 
240 Hyon Sun 1m v. Governor of Kyoto, 1993 HANREl JIH6 104 (Kyoto Dist. Ct., 
Feb. 23, 2007). 
241 Kang Bu Jung v. Governor of Osaka, 1718 HANREI JIH6 30 (Osaka H. Ct., Oct. 
15, 1999); 
242 ICESCR, supra note 203, art. 2(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5. They arrive at this 
conclusion by reading one particular provision of the ICESCR, which obligates State 
Parties to "take steps ... with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
right recognized [herein]." ld. 
243 See, e.g., Shiomi v. Governor of Osaka, 1363 HANREI JIH6 68 (S. Ct., Mar. 2, 
1989), ajf'ing 35 GY6SA1SHU 2220 (Osaka High Ct., Dec. 19, 1984), ajf'ing 31 
GY6SAJSHU 216 (Osaka Dist. Ct., Oct 29, 1980), ajf'd. Shiomi first applied for a 
pension in 1972, but was rejected. IWASAWA, supra note 113, at 172. She sued the 
Governor of Osaka in 1973, but the Osaka District Court dismissed her case in 1980. ld. 
She filed another lawsuit in 1985, after Japan changed its pension laws. ld. at 174 This 
suit was dismissed by the Osaka District Court in 1994, the Osaka High Court in 1996, 
and the Supreme Court in 2001. See Top Court Rejects Blind Ex-Korean National's 
Pensions Claim, KYODO NEWS AGENCY , Mar. 13, 2001, http://www.lexisnexis.com 
(Follow "Find A Source," query "Japan Economic Newswire," query "court and blind 
ex-Korean") (last accessed Mar. 26, 2011); Hyon Sun lm v. Governor of Kyoto, 1993 
HANREI JIH6 104 (Kyoto Dist. Ct., Feb. 23, 2007). Hyon and four other elderly resident 
Korean plaintiffs are suing to gain access to old age pensions; Kyoto Court Dismisses 
Korean Residents' Claim over Denial of Pension, JAPAN EcoN. NEWSWIRE, Feb. 23, 
2007, http://www.lexisnexis.com (Follow "Find A Source," query "Japan Economic 
Newswire," query "Kyoto court dismisses Korean") (last accessed Mar. 26, 2011). 
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refuse to extend pension rights to resident Korean claimants and 
refuse to find the existing pension scheme illegal. These lawsuits 
do not reflect well on the idea that courts can substantively 
entrench international human rights in order to contradict or 
overrule domestic policies that plainly violate treaty tenns. 
On occasion, courts have used their verdict to appeal to the 
Diet to bring about changes. For instance, a resident Korean 
veteran from World War II challenged the government's refusal to 
provide him a pension?44 Kang Bu-jung applied for a pension to 
cover an injury sustained while he served in the Japanese Navy 
during World War Il. 245 Kang was a Japanese citizen when he 
received the mJury, but lost his citizenship with the 
denationalization of all Koreans in 1952.246 That meant he was no 
longer able to receive a military pension under the Assistance 
Law.247 He applied for a pension in 1993, but was turned down 
because of the nationality requirement of the 1952 Assistance 
Law.24s 
On appeal, the Osaka High Court noted that the right to 
equality enshrined in Article 26 of the ICCPR and A.Iiicle 2(1) of 
the ICESCR was cotenninous with that enshrined in A.Iiicle 14 of 
the Japanese Constitution, which guarantees the right to 
equality.249 The court further determined that the ICESCR was not 
binding on Japanese courts, due to its language about progressive 
achievement, and hence its antidiscrimination provisions could not 
support the finding of an illegal violation.250 It did state, however, 
that the Assistance Law's exclusion of Kang, based on his 
nationality, "may have violated A.Iiicle 14 of the Constitution and 
A1iicle 26 of the ICCPR," both of which guarantee the right to 
244 See Kang, 1718 HANREI JIHO at 42. See generalZv Nonpayment of War Pensions 
to Koreans Unconstitutional, ASIAN PoL. NEWS, Oct. 18, 1999. 
245 Id.See Kang, 1718 HANREI JIH6 at 42. See generally Nonpayment of war 
Pensions to Koreans Unconstitutional, ASIAN PoL. NEWS, Oct. 18, 1999. 
246 Jd. 
247 The 1952 Law for Assistance to War Victims and Their Bereaved Families 
required that recipients of assistance hold Japanese citizenship. See lWASA WA, supra 
note 113, at 176. 
248 See Nonpayment of War Pensions supra note 244. 
249 See Kang, 1718 HANREI JIHO at 48. See generally Nonpayment of War Pensions 
to Koreans Unconstitutional, ASIAN PoL. NEWS, Oct. 18, 1999. 
250 Id. at 50. 
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equality. 251 The court further "requested the Diet to take 
legislative measures to correct the legal treatment of these 
people. "252 
While the court specifically rejected the notion that the 
ICESCR could have direct or indirect effect in this case, it 
nonetheless fused the normative force of international law (the 
binding ICCPR) with domestic constitutional law to suggest that 
domestic law may have been illegal.253 While this conclusion is 
not as strong as, say, an outright finding of a violation, it 
nonetheless represents progress in the ongoing domestication of 
the nonns of international law. It also recalls the circuitous 
criticism of the fingerprinting system discussed in the Yun 
decision. 254 Japanese courts do not "call out" the political 
branches as United States courts sometimes do, but their less 
confrontational stance can signal disapproval with much the same 
effect. 
III. Conclusion: The Signaling Function of International Law 
Minorities face a number of challenges in asserting their rights 
in many jurisdictions. Quite apart from procedural impediments-
knowing one's rights, hiring a lawyer, trusting the legal system 
enough to bring a claim-the legal system itself may offer limited 
channels to challenge discriminatory policies or laws. That has 
certainly been the case with minorities in the United States and 
Japan. Given some of the structural obstacles that the domestic 
legal system may pose to the protection of minority rights, 
international human rights law can play a helpful role. 
Intemational law provides a significant amount of support for the 
entrenchment of various rights, both positive (the right to a 
pension, the right to enjoy one's culture) and negative (the right 
not to be discriminated against, the right not to be fingerprinted). 
Intemational law has contributed to the diversification of 
Japan, or at least to the expansion of protections of ethnic 
minorities under Japanese law and litigation. The revision of 
certain laws following ratification of key treaties has made most 
251 Jd. 
252 Jd. 
253 Jd. 
254 See supra notes 217-229 and accompanying text. 
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resident Koreans eligible for Japan's social welfare. But where 
Japan has not revised its laws to adhere to international standards, 
the lawsuit offers a mechanism to challenge discriminatory laws 
and an opportunity to register dissent over the unfairness of a 
pmiicular policy. These lawsuits permit judges a chance to reflect 
upon the constitutionality, sagacity, or desirability of the 
discriminatory law or policy at issue. In practice, Japanese comis 
rarely find a law unconstitutional, or chastise the Diet's failure to 
pass protective legislation. When they do, it sends a strong 
message to the legislature to review the offending law or policy. 
Sometimes an issue must be litigated many times before the 
underlying law is changed. Of course, not every suit brings about 
the desired policy change, but it allows a challenge. 
This is not the end of the story, of course, as judges often 
decide just what form these international obligations will take, and 
how they will interact with existing domestic laws. But in the 
absence of real political power, as is the case for virtually all the 
minorities discussed above, litigation provides a powerful tool to 
challenge discriminatory laws and policies. In light of the fact that 
many domestic laws and policies themselves discriminate against 
minorities, recourse to international law helps buttress legal claims 
and prods judges to expand their horizon of consideration above 
the domestic plane. Litigation injects global standards into the 
evaluation and disposition of domestic policies-concerns that 
may be overlooked by the political process. The results are far 
from ce1iain, and frequently do not favor the plaintiff. But 
invoking international law provides a counterweight to a state that 
has long prioritized the dominant ethnicity. 
